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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Atomic balm 
The detention of former Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeni Adamov grows more 
and more interesting as it drags along.  Initially, it appeared as an extremely well 
timed extradition request by the United States, which complained to Swiss 
authorities that Adamov should face charges that he embezzled funds earmarked 
for securing nuclear facilities during his tenure (1998-2001) as Minister of 
Nuclear Energy.  The request (and Adamov's arrest in Bern) came just days 
before Condoleezza Rice was due in Moscow, intent on addressing issues of 
Russian nuclear safety and security of its nuclear materials.  Already, what might 
have been a simple corruption case had taken on ominously political overtones.  
 
Hard on the heels of the first stories came debate as to Adamov's worth to the 
United States:  Would he divulge Russia's nuclear secrets if he was extradited 
from Switzerland?  Clearly, there was some concern in Russia, as the state 
chose to file its own charges against Adamov to seek his extradition back to 
Russia, rather than the U.S. 
 
The Adamov case provoked intriguing memories of the Borodin–Mabetex case 
from early 2001:  Pavel Borodin (the former Kremlin "Butler" or Property 
Manager) was detained in the U.S. while awaiting extradition to Switzerland to 
face money laundering charges.  Oddly enough, then-Secretary of the Security 
Council, Sergei Ivanov, was in Washington to meet with Condoleezza Rice, 
Bush's then-National Security Advisor, and raised the issue of Borodin with her.  
(1) 
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The Borodin case, it may be recalled, was resolved when the Russian 
government paid a $3 million bond to Swiss authorities for the release of Putin's 
one-time boss (Putin's first Kremlin gig was in the Economic/Property 
Management office).  Borodin then was found not guilty by a Russian judicial 
body (of course, at that moment money laundering was not yet illegal in Russia).  
The $3 million payment was viewed as a ransom, of sorts, to keep Borodin out of 
jail and away from interrogators.   Soon after, Borodin was named to his current 
post in the Russian-Belarus Union, a position that carries immunity.  (2) 
 
As if anticipating the start of the haggling process over the price of freedom for 
Adamov, an unusual interview with Colonel-General Nikolai Solovtsov, 
Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, just days after Adamov's arrest in 
May 2005, began with questions about nuclear security and the safety of nuclear 
materials and proceeded directly to the question of the level of Adamov's 
knowledge of Russia's nuclear secrets:  "[A]s a minister, Solovtsov Adamov was 
privy to all classified information. (Š) In terms of Strategic Missile Forces secrets, 
Adamov is not a valuable asset." (3) 
 
Adamov, who pleaded his case in the Russian media with an article in Izvestiya 
in August and a call to Echo Moskvy from his Swiss jail cell in September, 
claimed that the charges evolved more from his role in strengthening Russia's 
international position (along with Yevgeni Primakov – whom Adamov singled out 
for particular praise) than his role in diverting US assistance funds.  (4)  In his 
radio call, Adamov emphasized his work with Anatoli Chubais, his "partner" in 
ensuring "Russia's nuclear energy stability." (5)  
 
Perhaps hedging his bet that his lauding of powerful officials would not be 
sufficient to save him from extradition, Adamov then played a desperate card: "If I 
spend at least [sic] a night in a US jail, there will be problems with state secrets." 
(6) 
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US indictments of Adamov, both from the US Federal Prosecutor's Office and the 
US Federal Grand Jury in Pittsburgh, PA claim that Adamov, while serving as 
Russia's Nuclear Minister, embezzled millions of dollars intended for nuclear 
safety and research programs.  According to the Federal Prosecutor's indictment, 
"Adamov fraudulently transferred to American firms under his control more than 
$15 millionŠ." (7)  
 
Earlier this month, Swiss authorities decided to extradite Adamov to the United 
States, with caveats about his repatriation to Russia, if found not guilty in US 
courts. (8)  The debate over Adamov's arrest and possible trial – including the 
question of what a Russian official with his level of security clearance was doing 
traveling abroad and just who permitted the misuse of funds earmarked for 
nuclear safety  – have reached a crescendo with the decision of the Swiss to 
extradite him. (9) 
 
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov downgraded Adamov's worth to US authorities, 
claiming that Adamov had no access to state secrets after 2000.  (10)  The 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, was pushed on the issue following his 
meeting with Condoleezza Rice, but denied that Adamov had been the subject of 
any discussions with the US Secretary of State.  (11)  Adamov, who ended his 
hunger strike upon hearing of the decision to extradite him (he had been 
protesting the delay in having his case resolved), must have been chagrined to 
realize that Russian authorities seemed unwilling to barter to keep him out of the 
hands of the American authorities. 
 
But there is still hope for ex-Minister Adamov:  US (Pennsylvania) attorney Mary 
Beth Buchanan, whose office issued the indictment for the arrest of Adamov, is 
currently in Moscow with an entourage of FBI and tax authorities.  Details of the 
visit are being held close to the vest, but it seems a possible accommodation 
over Adamov's fate is very much in the cards. (12) 
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Source Notes: 
 
(1) See The Ballad of Borodin, The NIS Observed, Vol. VI, No. 7, 18 Apr 01. 
(2) See "What price freedom? $3million," The NIS Observed, Vol. VI, No. 5, 21 
Mar 05. 
(3) Vremya novostey, 6 May 05; What the Papers Say (WPS) via ISI Emerging 
Markets. 
(4) Izvestiya, 16 Aug 05; WPS via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(5) Kommersant report of Ekho Moskvy interview, 7 Sep 05; WPS via ISI 
Emerging Markets. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) Moscow News, 18 Oct 05 via http://english.mn.ru/english/printver.php?2005-
39-24. 
(8) Ibid. 
(9) Leave it to former Nuclear Minister Mikhailov to stir the conspiracy theory pot:  
"How was it possible to transfer government funds to the accounts of private 
persons? And yet the Americans did it! (Š) It turns out that they closed their eyes 
to this specially in order to have grounds to blow up a scandalŠ" Rossiyskaya 
gazeta, 5 Oct 05; FBIS Translated Text via World News Connection (WNC). 
(10) ITAR-TASS, 3 Oct 05; FBIS Transcribed Text via WNC. 
(11) ITAR-TASS, 15 Oct 05; FBIS Transcribed Text via WNC. 
(12) ITAR-TASS, 7 Oct 05; FBIS Transcribed Text via WNC. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By John Kafer 
 
Over the past year, the ³Beslan Mothers² committee asked repeatedly to meet 
with President Putin to ask pointed questions over the perceived lack of progress 
in investigating the Beslan school hostage crisis of September 1-3, 2004.  
According to the Beslan Mothers committee, key regional leaders, as well as 
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Federal Security Service and Internal Affairs leaders bear responsibility for the 
outcome of the terrorist act which resulted in 331 hostages killed, including 170 
children. (1)  One year later, Putin agreed to meet with Beslan Mothers 
committee representatives at the Kremlin.  Following the September 2005 
meeting, Putin agreed to send yet another group of investigators from the 
Prosecutor General¹s Office to Beslan to ³revitalize² the year-old investigation 
and use the findings to reform the police and security services.  The new 
investigation will be led by the Deputy General Prosecutor, Vladimir Kolesnikov. 
(2)  
 
Certainly a reform of the security services is in order, but Putin cannot expect to 
uncover new, revealing evidence to forward this cause by establishing another 
investigation a year after the tragedy.  Two parallel investigations were already 
underway:  Alexander Torshin is Chairman of the Duma¹s parliamentary 
commission investigating Beslan; and Stanislav Kesayev is chairman of a 
separate, ad hoc, North Ossetian commission.  Additionally, the local Beslan 
community, lacking confidence in the Russian authorities, set up their own, 
unofficial investigation.  So far, the investigations revealed more questions than 
answers and do not address the heart of the security problems – resulting in a 
loss of confidence in Russian security forces among populations throughout the 
Caucasus. 
 
The contradictions among the various investigations and the lack of any 
conclusions have only added to the confusion.  Basic questions about the siege 
remain either disputed or unanswered, including the number of terrorists, how 
they arrived at the school, how the weapons were brought into the school, how 
and where fire was opened. (3)  For example, official Russian investigators insist 
there were only 32 terrorists (all of whom were killed except one, Kulayev, who is 
on trial), while various reports suggest there likely were more terrorists, some of 
whom got away. (4)  The North Ossetian investigator, Kesayev, was very critical 
of the uncoordinated actions of the various local and federal agencies.  He 
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questioned the security coordination that enabled the terrorists to accomplish all 
their preparatory work, including driving across several heavily-guarded borders 
to find an obscure school next to a police station via a route with many dead-end 
roads, without being stopped or checked.  The authorities then failed to surround 
the school for three days.  Kesayev also faults the organization of the 
investigation, which allowed the school site to be bulldozed the day after the 
siege ended, and investigators who failed to confiscate weapons for ballistics 
tests, did not examine clothes terrorists had changed into, and conducted no post 
mortems. (5)  At this point, none of the investigations are likely to uncover the 
true cause of the security failure or pinpoint blame.  There are too many varying 
witness accounts, changed testimony, and lost evidence.  
 
The lack of control throughout the crisis is clear.  There was simply no one in 
charge.  General Andreev, head of the local Federal Security Forces (FSB) 
division, was officially appointed commander on the second day; however, it is 
clear that proper coordination between the FSB, the armed forces, and the 
Interior Ministry never occurred. (6)  Although Putin assigned the FBS as the lead 
to fight terrorism in the Caucasus, it appears each security apparatus is fighting 
its own, uncoordinated war.  
 
In August, the Defense Ministry reported on the results of a 3,000 troop sweep of 
Chechnya.  Maj-Gen Sergei Surovikin, Commander of the 42nd Division, 
explained how they split the area into sectors, divided into subunits to control 
each sector, eliminated bandits and captured weapons.  However, it appears the 
only coordination that occurred with FSB officials, who are supposed to be 
leading the fight, was at the end of the sweep, when those captured by the 
armed forces were handed over to the FSB. (7)  
 
In a recent exercise, Russian Interior Minister Nurgaliyev praised the teamwork 
and the efficiency of Internal Troops and police subunits repelling a simulated 
rebel attack in the Chelyabinsk Region.  The exercise had many moving parts 
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including amphibious troops, helicopters, a hovercraft, and various small arms, 
but no FSB. (8)  
 
While Russian forces have held occasional exercises to increase the level of 
coordination between the disparate security forces, they do not appear to have 
been effective.  Initial reports from the most recent militant attacks in the city of 
Nalchik in the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic, against multiple police, FSB, and 
Internal Affairs targets indicate another slow, uncoordinated response by 
Russia¹s military and security forces. (9)  It appears that Putin¹s curious decision, 
ten days after the Beslan crisis, to abolish direct gubernatorial elections allegedly 
to prevent the spread of terrorism was less than effective; the separatists¹ 
rebellions have spread to yet another republic.  The soldier fighting the war on 
the ground requires a clear chain of command from his supervisor all the way to 
the President.  The reform Putin needs is not another centralization of control, 
but an entire reorganization of all security functions in the military, FSB, and 
Interior Ministry.  The current structure looks surprisingly similar to the structures 
that existed during the cold war.    
 
Reforms themselves will not make the security forces more effective without 
addressing their loss of legitimacy as a result of pervasive corruption.  Russia¹s 
senior leaders recognize the need to fight corruption, but have not been effective 
in combating it.  President Putin gave Dmitri Kozak, the presidential envoy to the 
Southern federal district ³carte blanche to fight corruption in the security and law 
enforcement agencies² in the Caucasus. (10)  Additionally, Internal Affairs 
Minister, Nurgaliyev publicly criticized those responsible for corruption within the 
police forces.  He pointed to the lack of expertise among policeman and the 
tendency of staffers and servicemen to fraternize with criminals as particular 
contributors to corruption. (11)  Both Kozak and Nurgaliyev  themselves are 
alumni of the ³special services.² 
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In an annual corruption rating by Transparency International, Russia is tied in 
76th place out of 102 countries for its high rate of corruption. Police Major 
General Yuriy Kokov, First Deputy Chief of the RF MVD Department for 
Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism, who is considered one of the leading 
specialists in combating corruption in Russia, assessed the situation regarding 
official corruption in Russia. (12) Russian legislation lacks a concept of corruption 
which makes it difficult to prosecute. He criticized Russia¹s lack of statistical 
records on manifestations of corruption, hindering efforts to organize effective 
programs to counter it. He provided numerous examples to highlight how much 
corruption has permeated society, from regional officials accepting bribes to 
provide tax benefits for corporations, to doctors and medical facilities accepting 
bribes for treatment, to police routinely accepting bribes.  General Kokov 
recognizes that fighting corruption requires the broad support of the population 
and will take a complex solution, which would include effective law enforcement 
activities, increasing wages, and actively engaging public institutions and 
ordinary citizens. (13)  
 
General Kokov primarily addressed corruption by Russian government officials; 
much of the corruption in the Caucasus involves bribes and abductions, which 
permeate through the security personnel at the lowest levels.  It is highly unlikely 
the Beslan hostage takers were not confronted by police at various checkpoints.  
In all likelihood, meagerly paid security forces accepted a ³standard toll² to 
enable their transit.  Regarding kidnappings, international human rights groups 
blame Russian federal troops and security forces for an estimated 1700 
abductions throughout Chechnya (14).  
 
The continued dispute over the number of Beslan terrorists adds to the lack of 
credibility among Russia¹s security services.  Official Russian accounts continue 
to insist the number was 32, while local accounts insist there were far more. (15)  
Russia¹s security forces need to address basic problems of corruption and loss 
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of legitimacy before that can hope to become effective fighting separatists in the 
Caucasus or elsewhere.  
 
Aleksandr Torshin stated that the parliamentary commission investigation of 
Beslan is final, but the report will not be ready before the end of the year.  He 
freely admitted that after one year¹s work, there are now more questions than 
answers. (16)  The Beslan Mothers are asking Putin to find those responsible for 
the security failures and make them accountable for their actions and their 
failures.  It is clear that the security response (or lack thereof) and subsequent 
investigation into the Beslan tragedy was so poorly led and uncoordinated that no 
one knew what was going on or who was responsible.  An additional 
investigation, one year later, is unlikely to uncover new evidence to the contrary.   
Perhaps Putin agreed to re-investigate this tragedy because he is bending to the 
new political pressures from the vocal Beslan Mothers Committee; perhaps he 
has a particular scapegoat in mind.   
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1 Sep 05 via World News Connection (WNC). 
(2) ³Putin Accepts Guilt for Beslan Tragedy² by Simon Saradzhyn, Moscow 
Times, 8 Sep 05 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(3) ³Russia: Official, Local Versions of Beslan Siege Cause 'Open Tension,'² by 
Madina Sageyeva, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 21 Aug 05 via WNC. 
(4) "Gunmen Miscounted. North Ossetians Certain That There Were More 
Terrorists in School Than Investigators Claim," by Andrey Riskin, Nezavisimaya 
gazeta, 5 Nov 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-1105 via WNC 
(5) ³Stanislav Kesayev:  Khodov was an Agent of Four Special Services² by 
Timofey Borisov, Rossiyskaya gazeta, 12 Sep 05; What the Papers Say via ISI 
Emerging Markets.  
(6) ³There were Actions that Resembled Storming the School,² by Pavel Pushkin, 
Kommersant-Vlast, 29 Aug 05 via Lexis-Nexis.  
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(7) ³Russian Division Deploys 3,000 Regular Troops in Chechnya Sweeps², Itar-
Tass, 12 Aug 05, via WNC. 
(8) ³Interior Minister Praises Southern Russian Anti-Terror Exercise,² Itar-Tass, 5 
Oct 05 via WNC.  
(9) ³Nalchik Under Attack: Moscow Unable To Respond,² Eurasia Daily Monitor, 
14 Oct 05, Vol 2, Issue 191.   
(10) ³Further Reforms to Security and Law Enforcement Agencies,² by Marina 
Saidukova, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 Jul 05 via Lexis Nexis. 
(11) ³Criticism With Unchanged Content,² Gazeta.ru, 13 Sep 04 via WNC. 
(12) Rossiyskaya gazeta, 21 Aug 05 via WNC.  
(13) Ibid.  
(14) ³Putin Hints He May Stay in Politics,² by Oksana Yablokova and Francesca 
Mereu, Moscow Times, 28 Sep 05 via Johnson¹s Russia List (JRL) #9256. 
(15) ³Russia: Official, Local Versions of Beslan Siege Cause 'Open Tension,'² by 
Madina Sageyeva, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 21 Aug 05 via WNC. 
(16) ³Parliamentary Report on Beslan Now In Doubt,² Izvestiya, 8 Sep 05 via 
WNC. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Rebecca Mulder 
 
Bilateral matters 
LITHUANIA 
Russia¹s relations with Lithuania and its Baltic neighbors took a turn for the 
worse when a Russian fighter pilot recently ejected recently from his SU-27 
fighter jet before crashing into an empty field. Other contentious issues were 
sidled as Lithuania undertook an investigation into the crash. With the 
investigation now complete, and theories that the incident was a fumbled 
intelligence mission or a test of NATO¹s air defenses put to rest, the Russian pilot 
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has been repatriated. (NATO forces did not become engaged.) It remains unclear 
why his plane was fully equipped for combat. 
 
An uncooperative Russia withheld information that the Lithuanians deemed 
critical to the crash investigation. Lithuania ³followed the letter of international 
law, treated the Russian pilot with full courtesies, and allowed a Russian team of 
officers to witness all phases of the investigation.² (1)  (NATO treated the 
investigation as a bilateral matter between Lithuania and Russia and distanced 
itself from the incident.) Although the crash has highlighted possible Russian 
threats to Baltic security, it seems unlikely to add momentum to Lithuania¹s effort 
in the European Union to raise the issue of demilitarization of the Kaliningrad 
region. 
 
IRAN 
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov again has denied a recent British news 
report which alleged that former members of the Russian military had helped Iran 
secretly to obtain technology needed to make missiles capable of hitting 
European capitals. 
 
The British news report stated that the Russians were intermediaries in a multi-
million dollar deal negotiated between Iran and North Korea in 2003, enabling 
Tehran to receive regular clandestine shipments of top-secret missile technology. 
(2) 
 
The British news report was published following a visit to Russia by US Secretary 
of State Condoleezza Rice. Calling the report ³delirium² and ³nonsense,² and 
indirectly addressing Washington¹s concerns, Ivanov responded by stating that 
³Russia is a responsible partner and is interested in the strict observance of all 
nonproliferation regimes.² (3) Ivanov went so far as to accuse Britain indirectly of 
involvement of proliferation, recalling a European international consortium that 
developed a few years ago and included British companies. According to Ivanov, 
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the consortium delivered a uranium centrifuge to Pakistan, which later surfaced 
in Iran. (4) 
 
THE US 
Despite diplomatic remarks by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei 
Lavrov¹s, following recent talks in Moscow with US Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice, the visit was not without tension and disagreement. The two 
clashed over Iran¹s nuclear program and exchanged views on Central Asia 
following Rice¹s trip to the region, which noticeably excluded a stop in 
Uzbekistan. Lavrov reiterated that Iran should not pursue nuclear proliferation, a 
view held in common with the US, but he disagreed with Rice¹s stance that Iran 
cannot be trusted with uranium enrichment. Rice¹s response countered the 
notion that Iran has a ³right² to enrich uranium: ³It is not a question of rightsŠthe 
NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] doesn¹t come only with rights but also with 
obligations.² (5) This disagreement over Iran¹s nuclear program is not a new 
issue in US-Russian relations, however the rift between the two countries was 
clearly evident following Rice¹s unexpected visit. 
 
During the talks, Rice reaffirmed that Washington would not install any new 
military bases in Central Asia and that, as the threat from Afghanistan 
diminishes, the US presence will also diminish, although no time frame has been 
set for troop departures. Following her visit to Central Asia and her talks with 
Lavrov, Rice met briefly with President Putin, who congratulated her on the 
results of her trip. (6)  However, Putin¹s remarks highlighted another area of 
discord between Russia and the United States: the contest for influence in 
Central Asia. 
 
Seizing a possible opportunity in Central Asia, Lavrov and other Russian officials 
have criticized US and EU sanctions against Uzbekistan, calling for ³dialogue 
instead of sanctions.² The latter were intended to punish Uzbekistan¹s leadership 
for backsliding on democratic reform, its ruthless handling of the May riots in 
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Andijan, and the eviction of American troops from the Karshi-Khanabad base. 
This rift between the West and Uzbekistan has given Moscow an edge in 
pursuing stronger relations with Tashkent. Russian-Uzbek joint military exercises 
in September and Uzbek President Karimov¹s invitation to Putin to upgrade their 
relationship from the level of strategic partnership to that of ³full-blown alliance² 
seem to indicate this increasing closeness. (7) Recent statements by the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) also emphasize Moscow¹s 
reassertion in the region, while denying that a Central Asian army group, 
supported by Russia, would be created in the near future so as to defend CSTO 
members from all sides. (8) 
 
The geopolitical struggle in the region between Russia and the US is often 
downplayed by Washington, but Moscow¹s decision to engage fully in the region 
– politically, strategically, militarily – is clear. 
 
RUSSIA AND THE WTO 
As the end of 2005 approaches, Russia¹s rush to join the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) seems to have slowed; it may join in 2006 or 2007 instead. 
Government officials now believe that timing is less important than the conditions 
under which Russia will enter, and with oil prices high, Russia can take its time 
and push for more favorable conditions. (9) Since 1993, Russia has been in the 
process of negotiating with the fifty countries that must approve its entrance into 
the WTO; Russia will engage in talks with ten of those countries throughout the 
next six weeks. The US, Canada, Australia and Switzerland appear to be the 
countries least favoring Russia¹s request. Disagreements over tariffs, Russia¹s 
exclusion of foreign banks, intellectual property rights, and agricultural matters 
remain most contentious. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Eurasia Daily Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation, 14 Oct 05, vol.2, issue 
191 via www.jamestown.org. 
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(2) Agence France-Presse 16 Oct 05, 327 GMT via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(3) ITAR-TASS, 17 Oct 05l BBC Monitoring, 17 Oct O5, 1011 GMT via ISI 
Emerging Markets. 
(4) BBC Monitoring, Ibid. 
(5) Agence France-Presse 15 Oct 05, 1942 GMT via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(6) Agence France-Presse, Ibid. 
(7) Eurasia Daily Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation, 13 Oct 05, vol. 2, issue 
190 via www.jamestown.org. 
(8) Eurasia Daily Monitor, Ibid. 
(9) Prime-Tass, 5 Oct 05 via Lexis-Nexis.   
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Robyn Angley 
 
The Public Chamber and the media 
President Vladimir Putin submitted a amendment to the State Duma on 13 
October to the law ³On the Public Chamber.² Putin wants to broaden the 
functions of the newly created Public Chamber to included oversight of the mass 
media. The Public Chamber¹s duties and privileges also would include the 
convening of citizens, mass media representatives and public organizations to 
discuss the issue of freedom of speech, the protection of citizens¹ access to 
legally available information, defense of freedom of speech by the media, and the 
drafting of recommendations or conclusions about issues related to free speech. 
These conclusions could be submitted to state organs or media outlets, 
depending on the circumstances. As usual, any action taken by the Public 
Chamber would remain purely advisory. An additional function of the Chamber 
would be to ensure that the media are not granting privileged access to one 
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political party (e.g. United Russia, the dominant party in the State Duma) over 
another. 
 
In accordance with the law that established the Public Chamber, Putin has 
selected the first third of the Chamber¹s 126 members. These 42 persons are 
supposed to choose the next 42 members from among nation-wide civic 
organizations. Finally, the remaining one third would be selected by the 
previously selected two thirds from among regional civic organizations. Although 
the Public Chamber ostensibly represents the active involvement of the Russian 
public, in overseeing the state, the members of the Chamber who have been 
selected by Putin are having trouble overseeing even the selection of the next 42 
members of the Public Chamber. Instead, that job is reportedly being carried out 
by Mikhail Ostrovsky, deputy chief of the President¹s domestic policy directorate. 
(1) 
 
The President¹s appointees to the Public Chamber represent a broad array of 
professions, including medicine, journalism and athletics. However, none of the 
members are from human rights organizations, the segment of civic groups most 
likely to criticize the present administration. The pro-Kremlin composition of the 
Chamber and the executive¹s unwillingness to relinquish responsibility for 
member selection suggest that the Chamber will struggle for any real influence 
on state policy. 
 
Moscow¹s elections and liberal political parties 
The democratic parties Union of Right Forces (SPS) and Yabloko have decided 
to put aside their differences long enough to contest Moscow¹s November 
elections on the same ticket. The two parties face a crisis of legitimacy because 
of the recently raised threshold for participation in the State Duma; 7 percent of 
the vote rather than the former 5 percent requirement. The elimination of single 
mandate seats, which had previously comprised half of the seats in the Duma 
and represented the best chance for small parties to gain a place in the 
 16 
legislature, also complicates the task of such parties attempting to play a role in 
the government. The SPS-Yabloko joint ticket will face a formidable opponent in 
United Russia, whose list of contenders will be headed by Moscow Mayor Yuri 
Luzhkov. The success or failure of the SPS-Yabloko venture could well 
determine whether either party contests the next Duma elections. 
 
Foreign media licensing 
The task of licensing foreign publications has been transferred from the Press 
Ministry to the Federal Service for Preservation of Cultural Values. This shift in 
responsibilities was announced not long after ABC aired an interview by Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty correspondent Andrei Babitsky with Shamil Basayev, 
the notorious Chechen separatist. Foreign print licenses have not been issued 
since January, when the Press Ministry was dismantled. Deputy Head of the 
Federal Service for Preservation of Cultural Values Viktor Goreglyad has stated 
that licensure is not meant as a means of censorship. (2) However, the 
announcement¹s proximity to the ABC scandal gives rise to fears that it may be 
employed for exactly those purposes. Publications currently awaiting licensure 
include Ukrainian, British and American periodicals. 
 
Growing xenophobia 
The immigration of citizens from former Soviet republics to Russia on a seasonal 
or permanent basis in order to find work and better economic opportunities has 
led in some regions to heightened nationalism and aggression against ethnic 
minorities or members of other races.  For instance, the recent murder of a 
Peruvian student in Voronezh Oblast on 9 October has raised concerns about 
the increase of xenophobia in Russia. The murder occurred in a city park, with 
police nearby, although they were not patrolling the area. One suspect has been 
detained by local authorities. Officials consider the murder to be ethnically 
motivated. Local groups, including human rights organizations and other civic 
groups, have asked Governor Vladimir Kulakov to establish an independent 
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council to address the issue of xenophobia. The proposed council would involve 
government representatives as well as human rights activists. (3) 
 
Another example of aggression against ethnic minorities involves the Batumi 
Kurds (Kurmanch), Khemshil, and Yezids of Krasnodar Krai in the region of 
Kuban. The Batumi Kurds were deported by Stalin to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan in 1944. They moved to the Kuban region (located in Krasnodar 
Krai) in the 1980s along with the Khemshil Meskhetian Turks. These ethnic 
minorities have appealed to the United States for refugee status on the basis of 
³repeated racist statements made by the governor of Krasnodar Krai² (Aleksandr 
Tkachev) and ³endless degradations and acts of repression by the authorities 
and militarized structures.² (4)  
 
The ethnic minorities seeking refugee status comprise approximately 2500 
persons. Although more than 80 percent of the Batumi Kurds have received 
citizenship and registration, it has not prevented abuse by local authorities. The 
Batumi Kurds submitted their request to the US ambassador a year ago. They 
were informed initially that their plea was not being considered. However, State 
Department officials have met recently with human rights organizations that are 
working on the issue. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) ³Russian paper reveals confusion in newly-formed Public Chamber,² 
Kommersant, 11 Oct 05; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) ³Licensing of foreign print media to resume,² Gazeta, 12 Aug 05; BBC 
Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) ³Voronezh NGOs call for council to fight xenophobia after student's murder,² 
Itar-Tass, 10 Oct 05 via World News Connection (WNC).  4) ³Ethnic minorities in 
Krasnodar Krai appeal for US refugee status,² Izvestiya, 14 Oct 05 via WNC. 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Marcel LeBlanc and Jeffrey Butler 
 
INTERNAL 
Russian missile strategy 
Russia appears committed to the effort of reestablishing strategic nuclear parity 
with the United States. Russian military exercises and testing increased 
significantly in recent months with particular emphasis on long range missiles.  In 
late September, Russia held a large-scale exercise of its Strategic Missile 
Troops, demonstrating the ability to secure its weapons from terrorists while also 
projecting the capability of the Topol missile to defeat missile defense systems. 
(1)  Also in September, Russia demonstrated a new submarine-launched ballistic 
missile, the R-30 ³Bulava² which includes features designed to defeat emerging 
ballistic missile defense systems. (2)  Moreover, Russian strategic forces 
conducted several other launches of older missiles as part of training and 
maintenance of the ICBM force as well as a new nuclear-capable air-launched 
cruise missile. (3)    
 
Recent strategic missile activity is consistent with Russia¹s continued reliance on 
strategic forces as a hedge against attack or coercion while continuing to 
modernize its conventional forces. (4)  The publicity surrounding the recent 
upswing in activity also points to Russia¹s desire to be a player on the world 
stage.  Russia¹s conventional force capability is significantly less than the 
juggernaut status of the old Soviet Union; however, it is clear that the Russian 
political and military leadership continues to view Russia¹s tremendous nuclear 
capability as vital to national prestige as well as a counter to Western influence.  
Any hint of the previous debate between Kvashnin and Dvorkin over decoupling 
nuclear force levels from the US is gone, and Russia is committed to nuclear 
parity. (5) 
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Russia and the United States 
Russia¹s long-term nuclear strategy is focused primarily on the United States. 
(Unquestionably, there is a short-term priority on securing the ³Near-Abroad² 
through diplomatic, economic, and military means.) Russia considers the U.S. as 
the primary opponent. (6) The concept of the ³main adversary² dates back to the 
Soviet period, and is focused on whatever power has the capability on inflicting 
decisive damage, irrespective of intent and verbal statements. The fact that the 
United States currently enjoys an overwhelming advantage in non-nuclear forces 
contributes to the Russian view that the United States is that main adversary. 
This approach feeds on U.S. discussions of preemptive nuclear strikes against 
suspected WMD states, continued exploration of the expanded use of nuclear 
weapons for missions such as ³bunker busting² and the development of ballistic 
missile defense. The U.S.-initiated NATO attack on Serbia, and its support of 
regime change in Ukraine and Georgia have served to reinforce such views, held 
particularly by the Russian military and security services. (7) 
 
The US pursuit of missile defense appears to have a significant effect on Russian 
nuclear forces.   Russian response to termination of the ABM treaty was to back 
away from the START II agreement on force structure. (8)  This maneuver 
allowed Russia not only to avoid the cost of dismantling its heavy missile force, 
but also provided greater flexibility in trying to defeat a hypothetical US missile 
defense through the retention of rockets with multiple warheads.  A specific goal 
of Russian missile modernization is to ensure, if possible, that future ballistic 
missiles can defeat missile defense.  Russian officials have consistently asserted 
that its new strategic missiles, such as the Topol-M, have the ability to defeat 
missile defenses well into the future. (9) 
 
The news is not all confrontational, and there has been some significant 
cooperation between the US and Russia on nuclear threat reduction.  The 
cooperative efforts between the US, Russia, and other actors such as the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have had an impact on the reduction 
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of weapon grade materials and on ways toward a putatively peaceful resolution 
to a nuclear related crisis.  In fact, these were the considerations that led to the 
IAEA receiving the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize. (11)  A joint US-Russian press 
release hailed the midpoint of a program to convert excess Russian weapons 
grade uranium into material for civilian nuclear power plants.  This program has 
converted some 250 tons (the equivalent of 10,000 nuclear warheads) to 
peaceful use. (12) US-and Russian cooperation efforts include the recovery of 
nuclear materials from post-Soviet Republics and former client states such as 
Czechoslovakia (13). 
 
Russia, Europe, and Asia 
No other nuclear power seems to concern Russia as much as the US. There 
appears to be decreasing nuclear tension between Russia and Europe. (10) 
Russia and China have increased cooperation to balance perceived US 
hegemony, particularly in Asia.  The expansive Peace 2005 military exercise and 
resolution of border issues also suggest an decreased level of distrust between 
China and Russia.  
 
US and Russian cooperation on nuclear counter-proliferation and threat 
reduction bears close scrutiny in the future.  While programs to secure Russian 
nuclear materials have undoubtedly made progress to date, but increasingly are 
stymied by the Russian refusal to provide access.  Russian military officials claim 
their nuclear assets are safe and do not need to provide the additional access 
requested by US inspectors. (14)  In addition, Russian suspicion of US motives is 
voiced repeatedly, and key Russian officials claim the US is intentional trying to 
edge Russia out of the global nuclear energy market by supposedly exaggerating 
the vulnerability of security measures and opposing the transfer of Russian 
nuclear know-how and material to Iran and North Korea. (15)  The recent 
extradition of the former Russian Atomic Energy Minister from Switzerland to the 
US to investigate proliferation charges is cited in this context. (16)  One area of 
particular concern is the security and use of tactical nuclear weapons – largely 
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neglected in negotiations to date, but representing a tempting target for terrorists. 
(17) 
 
The way ahead 
Nuclear superpower status is a centerpiece of Russia¹s strategy in Asia, Europe, 
and the global stage.  The maintenance and modernization of its strategic missile 
force also allows Russia to balance US, European, and Chinese pressure as it 
transforms its conventional forces and seeks to reestablish its influence in 
Central Asia. 
 
The Maintenance and aging of the Russian strategic missile force may become 
an area of increasing concern. Validating and characterizing the operation of 
aging missile systems are primary reasons for the increase in strategic missile 
testing.  Many of these systems are beyond their initial warranties, and it is likely 
that some of the test failures are due to the age and poor maintenance of the 
systems.  Hence, the sheer number of Russian nuclear missiles will provide 
significant deterrence; however, the aging inventory also presents a substantial 
risk in terms of safety, security, reliability, and cost.   In addition, Russian 
command and control and early warning systems will need to be maintained and 
improved in order to safeguard operation of the strategic missile forces. 
 
Continued cooperation on threat reduction and counter-proliferation will be an 
area of concern on the road ahead. 
 
Source Notes: 
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EXTERNAL 
Joint military exercises: benefits and risk 
This summer the Russians focused on joint military exercises with friends. (1)  
Specifically, the Russian military participated in separate exercises with China, 
Uzbekistan, and Armenia. These operations with foreign militaries offer the 
Russians some significant benefits, but are not without risk. 
 
China: Peace Mission 2005 
Russia teamed-up with China for this summer¹s Peace Mission 2005. Hailed as a 
first-of-its-kind exercise between the two countries, it presented Russia with an 
opportunity to gather intelligence and a chance to advertise hardware to its 
defense industry¹s biggest client. 
 
Gathering military intelligence is of vital importance, even when the object of 
one¹s efforts is an apparently friendly state.  When Russian troops joined 
Chinese troops to participate in Peace Mission 2005, it was the first time the two 
had worked in close concert since the Korean War. It was also a chance for the 
Russians to look in depth at Chinese military doctrine and capability, an 
opportunity the Russians did not pass up.  In fact, after the exercise was 
complete, military commanders admitted as much when they expressed 
disappointment in China¹s performance. (2) Such a low-risk approach to 
intelligence is very appealing. 
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However, just as the Russians gather information on their neighbors, so too will 
the latter reciprocate. Even before Peace Mission commenced a number of 
individuals in Russia stood accused of spying for the Chinese. (3) It is almost 
certain that the close contact during Peace Mission offered the Chinese further 
opportunity for exploitation. 
 
More apparent benefits of joint exercises are the indirect dividends from foreign 
arms sales. Today¹s Russian army is saddled with Soviet-era equipment, a 
problem all the more frustrating in light of the 20% increase in the military budget 
that still does not fund the research and development or modernization of military 
hardware. (4) Consequently, until the Kremlin can appropriate the funds 
necessary to revitalize its industry, Russian defense contractors will rely on 
countries like China to help keep them alive. Fewer than thirty days after the 
conclusion of Peace Mission, the Chinese implicitly acknowledged this reality 
with their commitment to purchase (U.S.) $1.5 billion worth of IL-76 and IL-78 
heavy-lift aircraft. (5, 6) 
 
Hand-in-hand with arms sales goes the risk of compromising military technology.  
Russian military commanders must consider whether they made a regrettable 
choice in selling their hardware to China.  Although Peace Mission 2005 
represented heightened levels of cooperation between Russia and China, the 
two countries have more history as either outright enemies or lukewarm allies. 
So, if history were to repeat itself, if the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) were to fail or if Chinese interests were to conflict too strongly with their 
neighbor¹s interests, Russian military commanders might face their own weapons 
on the field of battle. 
 
Uzbekistan: not China but still important 
Joint military exercises between Russia and smaller states are often overlooked. 
Such states lack the diplomatic heft of a country like China, and they certainly do 
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not have the same purchasing power.  However, to the Russian military, working 
with countries like Uzbekistan can be just as beneficial as working with China. 
 
The Uzbek-Russian joint military exercise of 21-23 September was 
unprecedented.  Moreover, Uzbekistan and Russia each participated with equal 
numbers of elite troops (about 200) in this relatively small operation. (7)  This 
contrasts sharply with Peace Mission 2005 in which the Russians had 
significantly fewer troops than their Chinese counterparts.  Such attention to 
balance and quality in the Uzbek-Russian exercise suggests a focus on tactics 
not seen in Peace Mission¹s heavy diplomatic emphasis.  
 
No less important than the identity of the participants was location. In the case of 
the Uzbek-Russian exercises, Russian troops trained in Uzbekistan¹s Nuratau 
Mountains against a simulated group of terrorists. (8) Flushing terrorist 
strongholds in the mountains of central Asia seems more relevant to Russian 
military commanders than Peace Mission¹s amphibious landing practice 
performed on the beaches of China¹s Shandong peninsula. 
 
Yet Uzbekistan¹s small size did pose a risk to the Russians.  Namely, working 
with the Uzbeks could have hindered good training.  Because an organization is 
never better than its weakest link and because smaller states such as Uzbekistan 
often have lower caliber militaries, the Russians ran the risk of training Uzbek 
troops at the expense of their own.  As they work with other small states in the 
future, the Russians must consider this pitfall or risk wasting time, money, and 
manpower. 
 
Armenia: important benefits over 10 years of joint exercises 
Unlike war games with the Uzbeks, the Armenian-Russian war games were 
conducted on a much larger scale, employing more than 1,000 troops and 
various tanks, airplanes, and other assorted military hardware to repulse a mock-
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invasion from the north. (9)  This three-stage exercise provided the Russians with 
very specific benefits. (10) 
 
First, the exercise continued support of a military command-and-control 
infrastructure strategically located beyond Russia¹s borders. Second, it focused 
on the logistical trail that extends from Russia through Caucasus hot-spots and 
into Armenia (a focus that includes often-overlooked but critical details like the 
condition of roads and pre-positioning of supplies.) Third, much like the Uzbek 
exercises, it focused on quality training for Russian and Armenian troops. 
 
The Russian-Armenian exercises do present a risk to Russian military 
commanders of overextending their resources.  The command-and-control and 
logistical infrastructure outside Russia¹s borders will require constant care and 
feeding.  So far, the Russians have been able to support this through 10 years of 
joint exercises with Armenia. (11)  But, as it participates in a similar way with 
more and more countries, the Russian military may find itself spread too thinly to 
support its commitments. 
 
Conclusion 
In many ways, Russia¹s military has been slow to change its Soviet-era mindset.  
Unprecedented joint exercises with China and with Uzbekistan and the 
continuation of a military relationship with Armenia indicate a new-found desire to 
test troops and equipment in the field.  This doctrine offers many benefits with 
some risk exposure.  Russian military commanders have stated their intent to 
continue joint operations in the future, an indication that they believe the benefits 
outweigh the risks. (12) 
 
Source Notes: 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Kate Martin 
 
Tragedy in Southern Russia 
Last week¹s attack in Nalchik highlighted the spreading unrest in the Caucasus 
region.  The attack on local, regional and federal structures was similar in many 
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ways to the July 2004 attack in Nazran, Ingushetia, by forces led by Shamil 
Basayev and Doku Umarov.  Nalchik also opened the still-sensitive wounds of 
the September 2004 debacle in Beslan. 
 
According to Kabardino-Balkarian presidential Chief of Staff Oleg Shandirov, 
³several hundred² militants were involved in the attack of the republic¹s capital 
city. (1)  The statistics vary with the sources.  When the fighting stopped, 61 
militants were killed, according to official sources while 17 were captured. (2)  In 
all, 24 troops and 12 civilians were killed, and 100 individuals were wounded, 
including 51 law-enforcement officers, eight seriously.  3)  A rapid-deployment 
police task force has since been established in the region. (4) 
 
Even before Nalchik, commemoration of the first anniversary of the deaths of 331 
schoolchildren and adults in Beslan, the result of hostage-taking by armed 
guerillas and the federal authorities¹ response, had already served as a focal 
point for analysts.  In that instance, many of those affected directly by the Beslan 
tragedy charge that the investigation has been (at best) misguided or (at worst) 
obstructionist. (5)  The Beslan Mothers, those whose children were killed, 
converged on Deputy Prosecutor General Vladimir Kolesnikov when he went to 
the site of the school, seeking answers to questions about the investigation into 
the assault on the school; they received only the mildest of reassurances that he 
cared more for them than for the ³bureaucrats.² (6) 
 
Chechen and Russian authorities continue to claim, with little evidence, that the 
situation on the ground is improving and that Chechen ³rebels² are being soundly 
defeated. (7)  The deteriorating situation cannot be blamed exclusively on those 
seeking independence.  Aside from incursions and attacks against government 
agencies, the region is beset by an increasing number of kidnappings. (8)  Many 
of these may be orchestrated by federal forces.  Amnesty International reported 
recently that there ³is no end to gross human rights violations in Chechnya and 
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Ingushetia with the Russian authorities implicated in the torture, abduction and 
secret detention of civilians.² (9) 
 
Although Russian-supported officials have denied Amnesty¹s charges, during a 
television show broadcast towards the end of last month Russian President 
Vladimir Putin admitted that the kidnappings in Chechnya, which he linked to 
unresolved ³security questions,² could be the work of pro-Moscow forces.  ³It is 
impossible to say who stands behind these crimes: disguised bandits or law 
enforcement workers abusing their power.² (10) 
 
Timing may have led to the relative speed with which the Nalchik incursion was 
suppressed.  Just one week before the attack, the North Caucasian Military 
District finished 10 days of exercises meant to improve mobilization of troops and 
weapons training. (11)  The exercise was just one example of a concerted effort 
by the military district to be prepared for crisis: while over 4,000 troops underwent 
the September training, another 2,200 reservists were assigned to participate in 
maneuvers held by the 58th combined Arms Army in the region this month. (12) 
 
There is certainly cause for increased training.  In 2005 there has been a 
reported total of 28 terrorist attacks and over 90 attacks on law enforcement 
officers in Dagestan, primarily in Makhachkala, according to Dagestani Internal 
Affairs Minister Adilgerey Magomedtagirov.  He added that OMON training of 
local officers had contributed greatly to the increased success rate of 
investigations and prosecutions.  ³A total of 23 terrorist acts have been cleared 
up, and two cases have been sent to court. Š. The identities of over 130 active 
members of bandit groups have been established; 55 of them have been 
arrested and convicted as a result of special operations; 34 have been eliminated 
when presenting armed resistance. Š All the arrested members of terrorist-
sabotage groups are currently confessing.² (13) 
 
 30 
Yet, there is also cause to wonder how good those confessions are.  Case in 
point: One week before the attack in Nalchik, two suspected religious extremists 
were arrested, accused of planning what officials termed a ³terrorist act² at 
Nalchik Airport. (14)  So, perhaps officials might have guessed that more than 
those two individuals were plotting something?  Yet within a few hours on the 
morning of 13 October, heavy damage reportedly was inflicted on several district 
police stations as well as Interior Ministry and Federal Security Service buildings. 
(15)  Other sites included the border guards headquarters and Š the airport. (16)  
 
This approach may create bigger problems in the long run.  At issue, according 
to Shamyl Beno of the Russian Islamic Heritage movement and former member 
of two Chechen governments, is the Russian center¹s inability or unwillingness to 
take into account the distinct nature of the peoples of the Caucasus.   ³What can 
be done to ensure that Chechens do not want to blow up Moscow in 20 years¹ 
time? Š In the Caucasus, people are accustomed to living independentlyŠ. The 
social aspirations of Chechens are simple: to have a home, a normal family, a 
car, the possibility to watch your children get married and to show society as a 
whole that every one of them has made it.  And all that is required of the regional 
authorities is not to get in the way of all this.² (17) 
 
Alas, it looks like Russian authorities have every intention of getting in the way: 
An additional 800 million rubles (over US$28 million) had been earmarked for 
infrastructure work in the North Caucasus Military District, including housing for 
two mountain rifle brigades in Dagestan and Karachayevo-Cherkessiya. (18) 
 
GEORGIA 
Paying attention to the man behind the curtain 
Following the ill-advised celebration of independence day in (the unrecognized 
republic of) South Ossetia, a reported shelling of Tskhinvali by Georgian troops 
(asserted by South Ossetian and Russian officials, and denied by Tbilisi), (19) 
and subsequent reports of shelling of Georgian villages from South Ossetia, the 
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Georgian parliament issued two diplomatic shots across the bow:  a demand for 
the removal of Russian troops, based on allegations that the Russian 
³peacekeepers² are turning a blind eye to violations of agreements, and the 
demand for a substantial change in the format of negotiations between Georgia 
and the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. (20) 
 
According to Georgian State Minister for Separatist Conflicts Giorgi Khaindrava, 
Tbilisi continues to seek a peaceful settlement to the conflicts in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, but is reacting to a perceived ratcheting up of the situation by 
others, particularly Russia, which has troops on the ground purportedly for 
peacekeeping purposes.  The military parade in Tskhinvali included the display of 
military hardware, specifically, tanks, Khaindrava said.  That hardware, he added, 
³is new, and South Ossetia had no other way of acquiring it except from Russia 
through the Roksky tunnel.²  In addition, both South Ossetia and Abkhazia have 
been holding military exercises. (21) 
 
³We do not understand why Russia is openly supporting and giving armaments to 
separatist authorities,² Khaindrava said. (22) 
 
Certainly, the suggestion that Russia remove its ³peacekeepers² managed to roil 
the waters, not calm them.  Sergei Shamba, the foreign minister of Abkhazia, 
responded that demanding the withdrawal of Russian forces would result in a 
return to hostilities. (23) 
 
Assuring all the players that Georgia does not want a resumption of hostilities, 
Khaindrava subsequently made a second demand.  ³Negotiations cannot go on 
in their current format, with representatives of Tbilisi, Tskhinvali, Vladikavkaz and 
Moscow.  The format should be changed. Š Russia and Georgia should settle 
problems in the conflict zone with the assistance of the OSCE,² he said. (24) 
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According to Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Loshchinin, any 
attempts to change the current negotiating process, which is being handled by a 
Joint Control Commission consisting of representatives of Russia, Georgia, 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia (i.e., with Georgia outnumbered 3:1), ³are 
counterproductive.² (25) 
 
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov asserted that Georgia does not get to 
make a unilateral decision of this sort.  The peacekeepers, Ivanov said, ³are in 
the conflict zone under the mandate which has been given to them by the two 
conflicting sides.  Abkhazia and Georgia, as well as South Ossetia and Georgia, 
should decide whether Russian peacekeepers should be there,² he said. (26) 
 
The new Georgian ambassador to the Russian Federation, Irakli Chubinishvili, 
was not quite as belligerent about Russia¹s actions, or inactions, as Khaindrava, 
but nonetheless remained firm about Georgia¹s expectations.  ³If Moscow is to be 
the mediator in this process, it should act more decisively instead of being so 
passive. Š If [the peacekeepers¹] work is unsatisfactory, there is no point in 
keeping them there.  The problem now is that Russian military officials Š did 
allow the heavy equipment of the South Ossetian army to join the parade.  A 
special agreement signed by Russia, Georgia, and South Ossetia, however, 
stipulates that no tanks, armored personnel carriers, or heavy weapons will be 
allowed within the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone.  This is something the 
peacekeeping forces should be enforcing.² (27) 
 
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili was quick to point out that this discussion 
does not negate other, more positive, negotiations between Georgia and Russia.  
To be sure, some discussions are successful: Russia agreed in September to a 
³full-scale withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia² beginning in 2006, 
a member of the Russian delegation said. (28) While not recognizing the 
authority of Russian officials placed in leading positions in the breakaway 
republics, Georgia is committed to maintaining relations with its significantly 
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larger and more powerful neighbor, he said.  ³A dialogue with Russia is a rather 
thorny process.² (29) 
 
Russian-Georgian relations are likely to get thornier:  a report out of Abkhazia on 
the establishment of an ethnic Georgian battalion in Abkhazia¹s Gali District 
includes the allegations of an interesting mix of carrot and stick recruitment 
policies:  Georgians are promised favorable conditions for family business 
endeavors, with the implied unfavorable conditions for those who refuse.  The 
price of signing up: renunciation of Georgian citizenship. (30) 
 
Meanwhile, Tbilisi has had to contend with rumblings from other ethnic minorities.  
Visiting Azeri official Nazim Ibrahimov, who led a delegation to Georgia to 
investigate the situation of ethnic Azeris living in Georgia, said ³The state 
committee had earlier conducted research and held meetings with our 
compatriots living in Georgia and familiarized itself with their problems. Having 
met them again and learnt their problems, we realized how serious the issue 
was.² (31)  Ibrahimov added that he saw a need ³to bring these problems to the 
attention of the Azerbaijani public and to raise the alarm.² 
 
While Ibrahimov did not elaborate further, Georgian officials are getting clearer 
signals from a representative of the Armenian population in the Georgian region 
of Samtskhe-Javakheti, who has complained of Georgians moving into the area 
in what he described as a ³large-scale attack against Javakhk.  David Rstakyan, 
chairman of the Virk organization, said the Georgian Armenians will work towards 
autonomy within the confines of the Georgian constitution; however, if those 
attempts fail, they will fall into actions of civil disobedience and form local 
authorities. (32)  While Rstakyan was quick to differentiate between the goals of 
the Javakhetians and the breakaway actions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, he 
noted that they are ³inspired² by the establishment of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
independent exclave in Azerbaijan. 
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AZERBAIJAN/ARMENIA 
Nagorno-Karabakh Update 
While Nagorno-Karabakh may serve as inspiration for the Javakhetians to seek 
autonomy in Georgia, the exclave is serving as inspiration for an arms race 
between Azerbaijan and Armenia.  Azerbaijan announced recently a plan to 
increase its defense budget to the equivalent of $600 million in 2006. (33) 
 
 ³Azerbaijan seeks to resolve the Karabakh problem peacefully, but the talks 
yield no results. Š Under these conditions, the buildup of a strong military 
potential is an important factor² that ³will be continued in future and will help to 
liberate the occupied territories,² President Ilkham Aliev said. (34) 
 
Armenia responded in kind, raising its defense allocation to $155 million in 2006, 
due to what it terms ³the militarist rhetoric of Baku.²  ³We view the enlargement of 
defense expenditure in the context of reality and do not forget that Azerbaijan is 
planning to enlarge its defense budget to $600 million next year,² said Mger 
Shakhgeldian, chairman of the Armenian parliament¹s defense and national 
security committee.  However, he added, ³It is our unambiguous opinion that 
international organizations should pay more attention to Azerbaijan increasing its 
military budget, and that an arms race is not the path that the region needs.² (35) 
 
Nonetheless, according to Armenian Deputy Defense Minister Artur Agabekyan, 
some of the increased defense spending will focus on 10 fighter jets, reportedly 
Russian SU-27 and SU-25 jets, as well as some MI-24 helicopter gunships. (36) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 Oct 05; FBIS translated text via WNC. 
(2) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 2 Sep 05; FBIS translated text via WNC. 
(3) Izvestiya, 7 Oct 05; FBIS translated text via WNC. 
(4) Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 5 Oct 05; FBIS transcribed text via WNC. 
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(5) www.mosnews.com/news/2005/10/07/alkhanovabduction.shtml . 
(6) Interfax, 30 Sep 05; FBIS transcribed text via WNC. 
(7) www.mosnews.com/news/2005/09/27/putinchechnya.shtml . 
(8) ITAR-TASS, 27 Sep 05; FBIS transcribed text via WNC. 
(9) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 3 Oct 05; FBIS translated text via WNC. 
(10) Izvestiya, 5 Oct 05; FBIS translated text via WNC. 
(11) Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 10 Oct 05; FBIS transcribed text via WNC. 
(12) Kavkaz-Tsentr News Agency, 13 Oct 05; FBIS translated text via WNC. 
(13) Rossiya, Channel One, NTV and AVN, 13 Oct 05; FBIS transcribed text via 
WNC. 
(14) Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 13 Oct 05; FBIS transcribed text via WNC. 
(15) ITAR-TASS, Radio Mayak and Channel One, 13 Oct 05; FBIS analysis via 
WNC. 
(16) ITAR-TASS, 14 Oct 05; FBIS transcribed text via WNC. 
(17) ITAR-TASS, 13 Oct 05; FBIS transcribed text via WNC. 
(18) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 6 Oct 05; FBIS translated text via WNC. 
(19) Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 11 Oct 05; FBIS transcribed text via WNC. 
(20) Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 21 Sept 05, Interfax and Rustavi-2 
Television, 5 Oct 05; FBIS transcribed text via WNC. 
(21) Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 13 Oct 05; FBIS transcribed text via WNC. 
(22) Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 29 Sep 05; FBIS transcribed text via WNC. 
(23) Ibid. 
(24) Georgian TV1, 29 Sep 05; FBIS translated text via WNC. 
(25) Interfax, 10 Oct 05; FBIS transcribed text via WNC. 
(26) Interfax, 30 Sep 05; FBIS transcribed text via WNC. 
(27) ITAR-TASS, 30 Sep 05; FBIS transcribed text via WNC. 
(28) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 3 Oct 05; FBIS translated text via WNC. 
(29) ITAR-TASS, 7 Sep 05; FBIS transcribed text via WNC. 
(30) ITAR-TASS, 5 Oct 05; FBIS transcribed text via WNC. 
(31) Rustavi-2 Television, 12 Oct 05; FBIS translated text via WNC. 
(32) Trend News Agency, 27 Sept 05; FBIS translated text via WNC. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Kazakhstan update: Gearing up for presidential polls. 
Earlier this year, Kazakhstan's strongest opposition party, Ak Zhol, underwent a 
serious crisis when it was discovered that Altynbek Sarsenbayev, one of the 
party's three co-chairmen, was holding coalition talks with other opposition 
groups. In mid-February, Alikhan Baimenov, Ak Zhol's second co-chairman, 
called a special plenary session of the Party to introduce a vote of no confidence 
against Sarsenbayev. Baimenov claimed that coalition talks were not permitted 
under the Party's Charter. (1) The motion passed, although several regional 
factions refused to participate. Not surprisingly, Baimenov's action caused a split 
in the Party's leadership: Bolat Abilov, Ak Zhol's third co-chairman, joined 
Sarsenbayev in calling the vote a "foolish escapade," and in publishing an open 
statement arguing that Baimenov himself had violated statutes by proposing the 
vote. (2) 
 
During the Party's 5th Congress, held in Astana in mid-March, Baimenov reacted 
to the Abilov-Sarsenbayev 'alliance' by announcing his own resignation. Both 
Abilov and Sarsenbayev refused to accept his decision. Their motivation could be 
explained by news which emerged days beforehand: The group at the center of 
the aforementioned coalition discussions, the Coordinating Council of Democratic 
Forces, announced the formation of a new organization called For a Just 
Kazakhstan. Although not a political party in its own right, the Coordinating 
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Council aimed to select a unified candidate to run against President Nursultan 
Nazarbaev in elections scheduled for the first Sunday in December. (3) Evidently 
Abilov and Sarsenbayev rejected Baimenov's decision to maintain Party unity, 
hoping that the unified candidate would come from within Ak Zhol's ranks. 
 
Following Parliamentary elections in September 2004, Zharmakhan Tuyakbai, 
Speaker of the Majlis and member of Otan (Nazarbaev's Party) resigned, 
claiming that there had been numerous violations during the polls. In April, he 
traveled with Abilov and Sarsenbayev to Moscow to meet members of the 
Russian opposition. During the course of this trip, Tuyakbai revealed in an 
interview with Nezavisimaya gazeta, that he had been selected as the 
opposition's unified candidate, and would run under the auspices of For a Just 
Kazakhstan. In the same interview, he revealed that the opposition had ties to 
"the west," and to "international organizations," and warned that Nazarbaev 
would use force to maintain his position. (4) 
 
Early in June 2005, deputies loyal to Nazarbaev introduced stifling anti-NGO bills 
to the Majlis. If the bills were passed, NGOs would be subject to closure by the 
government, and their funding, no matter what the source, subject to scrutiny by 
the state. After passing both Kazakhstan's upper and lower chambers, the bills 
were submitted to the Constitutional Council. (5) These bills must be viewed both 
as a reaction to Tuyakbai's statements, and as a result of the President's 
suspicion that western-supported NGOs were involved in fomenting the Kyrgyz, 
Ukrainian and Georgian revolutions. 
 
Late in August, the Council announced its ruling. In an open session in Astana, 
Igor Rogov, the Council's chairman, stated that the "basic norms" of the bills 
were "unconstitutional," but noted that the Majlis could introduce similar NGO 
laws in the future. (6) Presumably Rogov meant that the Constitutional Council 
does not object in principle to NGO monitoring, as long as the illegal aspects of 
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the bills are removed. At this juncture, no detailed ³opinion² has been issued by 
the body to explain which sections it views as unconstitutional. 
 
An increasing fear of foreign intervention is evident on Nazarbaev's part: 
Reacting early in September to news of a meeting between Tuyakbai and former 
President Clinton (on a visit to the country), Nazarbaev stated that his opponent 
had "probably asked for supportŠprobably asked for money," adding the implicit 
threat that "Kazakhstan will not allow any interference in its internal affairs by any 
foreign country, any embassy or non-governmental organization." (7) 
 
Given this preoccupation, it is not surprising that President Nazarbaev has 
continued his pursuit of NGOs, making statements which could be read as 
explicitly attacking the Council's decision. During a September 14 press 
conference, the President warned that NGOs would not be allowed to support 
"this or that candidate on behalf of international or Kazakh" organizations. (8) 
The government, he stated, would "closely follow" the activities of these 
organizations. In his view, moreover, the Majlis had been justified in its actions 
because it could "see the dangers taking place in neighboring countries, where 
foreign NGOs impudently pumped money and destabilized society." (9) 
 
On September 8, the Central Election Commission issued a press release which 
announced that the nomination period for Presidential candidates would begin 
the following day and last until October 3. By that date, the CEC had certified a 
total of eleven candidates: Nazarbaev, Tuyakbai, Walikhan Kaisarov & Yerassyl 
Abylkassymov (both Parliamentarians), Mekemtas Tleulessov (an Almaty 
lawyer), Baltabai Rakhimzhanov (President of the National Farmers Federation), 
Nhaksybai Bazilbayev ('Alfa' Public Association Chairman), Mels Yeleussizov 
(Chairman of the 'Tabigat' Environmental Group), Salim Oten (a 'prominent' 
businessman), Amantai-kaji Assylbek  and Alikan Baimenov (listed as Ak-Zhol 
leader). (10) Baimenov's candidacy shows that the attempt to unify the opposition 
has failed. Since Baimenov is listed as Ak Zhol's candidate, it seems logical to 
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conclude–until evidence to the contrary emerges–that Abilov and Sarsenbayev 
have split from Ak Zhol, and remain in Tuyakbai's camp. 
 
More recent events show that Nazarbaev feels most threatened by Tuyakbai's 
(apparently foreign-supported) candidacy. To that end, the Kazakh government 
has engaged in a harassment campaign against him. First, in mid-August, 
Tuyakbai received a visit from State Prosecutors warning him about "illegal 
election campaigning." (11) In late September, an arson attack, which damaged 
computers and other electronic equipment, but in which no-one was harmed, was 
carried out on Tuyakbai's Headquarters (12). Finally on October 12, heavily 
armed police officers arrested his campaign manager, Tolen Tokhasynov, on 
charges of organizing an illegal political meeting in Almaty. (13) How long he will 
be held is not clear, but it would seem safe to assume that the aforementioned 
events are designed to cause maximum damage to Tuyakbai's Presidential 
hopes.  
 
Tuyakbai himself has attempted to allay Nazarbaev's concerns. In mid-
September, Tuyakbai ruled out mass protests, telling reporters that even if 
violations were discovered during the elections, For a Just Kazakhstan did "not 
have an objective of taking people to the streets," but would seek to resolve 
issues through the legal system. (14) Given Kazakhstan's multiple fraudulent 
elections—and the lack of popular response thereto, it is safe to predict that no 
protests will materialize in December.  
 
The cumulative effect of these incidents is a view of Kazakhstan's opposition 
groups as empty vessels. Despite holding discussions, the Kazakh opposition is 
incapable of working together even for the purpose of defeating President 
Nazarbaev. Moreover, past experience–notably following last September's 
elections—when the opposition threatened mass protests, but none occurred, 
shows that there is little popular appetite for rebellion against Nazarbaev. 
Realistically, the President's position is safe. But given Nazarbaev's current 
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paranoia regarding foreign "interference," it is likely that Kazakhstan's major 
cities and their government compounds and buildings–most (especially the 
Presidential Palace{s})–will see an increased Security Services, Interior Ministry 
and Police presence in the weeks before, during and immediately following 
Election Day.  
 
Uzbekistan Update: The Andijan "Trial" begins 
Throughout March, April and early May, Andijan witnessed peaceful protests 
outside the town courthouse. The crowds gathered there were demonstrating 
against the detention and trial of 23 local businessmen, charged with supporting 
Islamic extremism. On May 12, government forces arrested a number of 
protestors, detaining them in Andijan's prison. At midnight, a group of 100 people 
attacked a local military garrison, seizing their weapons. After freeing 
approximately 4000 prisoners, the crowd—by now 10,000 strong—moved to the 
town's Central Square, where it began to call for President Islam Karimov's 
resignation, and to demand changes to the government's economic policies. (15) 
 
By this time, Interior Ministry Special Forces had arrived on the scene, and had 
surrounded and cut off the square. Early on May 13, these troops opened fire on 
the crowd, with no regard for unarmed persons. As the crowd attempted to flee, 
troops in jeeps, trucks and armored personnel carriers gave pursuit, killing as 
they moved. (16) It later emerged that snipers positioned on rooftops used high-
powered rifles to execute people missed by roving troops. At least 500 persons, 
possibly as many as 700, were killed. (17) 
 
President Karimov asserted at the time—and continues to assert—that the 
demonstrations were organized by Islamic extremists, specifically Hizb-ut-Tahir. 
Karimov claimed that the Andijan 'provocateurs' had ties to the Taliban in 
Afghanistan. He has claimed that the Uzbek government could prove its case 
with "recorded" telephone conversations between the "terrorists" and their 
controllers. (18) 
 41 
 
In the weeks and months immediately following the Andijan incident, the Uzbek 
government conducted a massive campaign throughout the country, aimed at 
finding the alleged militants responsible for the demonstrations. A report issued 
by Human Rights Watch claims that the NSS (National Security Service) used 
massive coercive methods, including beatings and more serious torture to extract 
"false confessions of belonging to extremist religious organizations and bearing 
arms while participating in the May 13 protest" from those detained. (19) The 
result of the government's "sweep campaign" was the arrest of 121 individuals. 
 
On 20 September, a trial at the Supreme Court in Tashkent began for the first 15 
defendants. (20) Events on the first day of the "trial" showed that the court case 
has a much deeper purpose than simply "establishing the guilt" of the accused—
all of whom confessed and pled guilty during the first session. (21) The Uzbek 
government's case—which makes little logical sense—is that the US Embassy, 
the BBC and other media outlets, and assorted Islamic extremists—trained by 
Chechens at camps in Kyrgyzstan (several defendants are Kyrgyz)–wished to 
overthrow the Karimov government. In a Central Asian version of the 'domino 
theory', the government claims that this conspiracy was the first step in 
establishing a worldwide caliphate, using Uzbekistan as a launch pad. (22) 
Several of the accused 'corroborated' the government's case. Effectively, the 
Karimov regime is claiming that Uzbekistan's sovereignty and national security is 
under threat from a multitude of sources. But the main 'culprit' is the US, which 
Karimov believes fomented the recent revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and 
Kyrgyzstan. 
 
The verdicts –death sentences – are a foregone conclusion in this trial; what 
matters is that Karimov is using the trial as an excuse for a complete ³lock-down² 
of the country, based on the aforementioned "threats" to his power. Two weeks 
before the trial began, the government announced a massive autumn military 
call-up. Under the terms of the President's decree, those who have finished their 
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fixed term of conscription are to be sent to reserve units. Citizens not drafted in 
the current call up—but who are eligible for service—are also to be sent to 
reserve units. Finally, commanders and officers are to "ensure that troops are 
well organized and combat ready" until all new recruits have been admitted and 
posted to their assigned active units. (23) Uzbekistan's military is to be at a high 
alert level for an unspecified period of time.  
 
A central part of this 'lock-down' includes a massive campaign against human 
rights campaigners and journalists—both Western and Uzbek—aimed at either 
imprisoning them, or forcing them to flee the country. The Human Rights Watch 
report cited above shows that the campaign has already started: 11 Uzbek rights 
activists have been imprisoned, while 15 have left the country. (24)  Moreover, 
the Uzbek government has openly stated that the Western media is guilty of 
"unleashing an information war" against the country, and of deliberately distorting 
facts. (25) 
 
Early in October, US officials held talks with Karimov aimed at persuading the 
Uzbek President to cooperate "across the board," including on "democratic and 
market reforms." (26) If cooperation were not forthcoming, the US, according to 
Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried, would "draw conclusions." (27) 
 
Taken together, the Uzbek government's trial allegations, outbursts against the 
Western media, and the lack of response to the United States' advances indicate 
that Karimov wishes to 'cleanse' the country completely of all Western (but 
especially US) influence, which he believes threatens his position. If this 
prediction is correct his next move likely will be the expulsion of all Western 
journalists and NGOs, as well as the possible cessation of diplomatic relations 
with the US. Internally, there is likely to be a massive purge of all those perceived 
as disloyal to Karimov. 
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(4) See NIS Observed: An Analytical Review, Volume X, Number 6 (28 April 05). 
(5) See NIS Observed: An Analytical Review, Volume X, Number 9 (11 August 
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Europe/Radio Liberty via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
Dismissal of Prosecutor-General creates new questions 
On 14 October, Ukraine President Viktor Yushchenko fired Prosecutor-General 
Svyatoslav Piskun, citing his constitutional right to do so, but providing no reason 
for the dismissal.  While most in Ukraine will not be sorry to see the beleaguered 
Prosecutor-General go, the timing of the dismissal creates new questions for 
Yushchenko and new concerns for those interested in ensuring that corruption is 
rooted out in the country. 
 
Piskun¹s office clearly did not fulfill the goals set for it by the Orange Revolution.  
The mastermind of the murder of journalist Heorhiy Gongadze remains at large, 
even though, in March, Piskun furtively suggested, ³This person is known.² (1)  At 
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the same time, the Prosecutor-General¹s office announced that three of the four 
individuals who carried out the murder had confessed and were in custody, but 
the investigation disturbingly has been hidden from view. 
 
It was Gongadze¹s death that sparked the first mass protests against the regime 
of former President Leonid Kuchma in 2001, and it was this case that President 
Viktor Yushchenko has promised repeatedly to solve.  It was, he said, ³a matter 
of honor.² (2) Further, he underscored, ³The main task now is to get to the most 
important thing: who organized and ordered the murder.² (3)  Nevertheless, 
despite a parliamentary investigation that named several high-ranking Ukrainian 
officials, including President Kuchma, as ordering the murder, and despite taped 
conversations of Kuchma that allegedly captured those orders, no progress has 
been made on bringing those who arranged the murder to justice.    
 
Piskun, who  served under the Kuchma administration, also had little success in 
pursuing the organizers of electoral fraud during the 2004 election.  In June, 
Deputy Prosecutor Viktor Shokin confirmed that his office had instituted ³778 
criminal cases relating to violations of electoral legislation during the 2004 
presidential election.² Of these, he said, ³nearly half – 361 criminal cases – have 
been sent to court.²  However, he also suggested  that locating those who 
tampered with a computer server at the Central Election Commission, as well as 
³the organizers of the ballot rigging,² would be difficult.  ³They are very sizable 
cases that call for a large amount of time to be spent,² he said. (4)  Shokin¹s 
statement seemed to ignore the fact that during the revolution the Security 
Services of Ukraine publicly distributed a tape said to include conversations 
between CEC members planning voter fraud.  Despite this potential evidence, 
and despite a number of witness statements, not a single individual thought to 
have organized the large-scale fraud, which led directly to the revolution, has 
been charged.  
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For months, the majority of Ukrainians have called for Piskun¹s ouster, in hopes 
that this would lead to the justice for which so many protested late in 2004.  
However, the former will not necessarily lead to the latter.  While a new 
Prosecutor-General may, in fact, vigorously and successfully pursue the cases 
that now seem to be lying dormant, it is just as likely that he or she simply will 
maintain the status quo.  This is especially true if the Prosecutor-General is not 
the one making decisions or setting policy regarding high-profile cases.  
 
Former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko has suggested that Yushchenko and 
his allies are protecting former President Kuchma, tying the prosecutor¹s hands.   
She and many others have long speculated that Yushchenko privately agreed to 
protect Kuchma from potential prosecution in the Gongadze case in exchange for 
his support for a negotiated settlement during the Orange Revolution.  
Yushchenko¹s refusal to dismiss Piskun for nine months, despite repeated calls 
to do so publicly by some of his revolution allies and privately by Western 
international organizations, lends credence to this theory.  It is also supported by 
the fact that, for months, Yushchenko publicly discouraged parliament from 
hearing the final report of its committee investigating the murder – a report which 
found Kuchma responsible.  In September, Gongadze¹s widow, Myroslava, said, 
"Unfortunately, even now there is no political will to find those who ordered the 
killing." (5) If this is the case, a new prosecutor-general will make no difference.  
 
Yushchenko¹s critics also have suggested that delays in pursuing the organizers 
of electoral fraud may be related to the president¹s alleged agreement with 
Kuchma or those close to him, and a fear of exacerbating regional cleavages, 
since the majority of the fraud organizers likely would be located in the East or 
South of Ukraine.  Yushchenko¹s recent signature on a bill providing immunity 
from prosecution to all Ukrainian elected officials, and his agreement to introduce 
a bill potentially providing amnesty for those accused of electoral fraud, provide 
support to these theories.  In this case, too, replacement of the prosecutor-
general will change nothing.  
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There is one potential shift that is likely to occur as a result of the removal of 
Piskun – the new chief prosecutor will be more closely allied to the president.  
This could provide a useful tool in the run-up to the parliamentary elections of 
March 2006.  Whether this result was intended or not, the timing of Piskun¹s 
dismissal creates questions.  
 
One month ago, Piskun announced that five criminal investigations had been 
opened dealing with corruption and abuse of office by those within the National 
Security and Defense Council (NSDC), which is technically led by the president.  
These five cases were launched following charges by Yushchenko¹s former chief 
of staff, who suggested that some of the president¹s closest aides were engaging 
in corrupt activities.  
 
Just one week ago, Piskun opened a new case against former NSDC Secretary 
Petro Poroshenko, who is also one of Yushchenko¹s closest confidants. Piskun 
charged that Poroshenko threatened to block construction of a new apartment 
complex in downtown Kyiv if he didn¹t receive space in the building or shares in 
the project.  Piskun also was reportedly investigating Poroshenko¹s dealings with 
businesses in Moldova, and possible pressure placed on judges in several high-
profile cases.   Moreover, the president had requested that Piskun examine 
whether former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, Yushchenko¹s former ally and 
current opponent, had pressured courts to forgive the debts of her former 
company. 
 
On 17 October, Piskun charged that his dismissal came because he refused to 
institute criminal proceedings against Tymoshenko, and refused to drop 
proceedings against Poroshenko.  Piskun said, on the night before his dismissal, 
Yushchenko  ³reproached me because I ostensibly closed the criminal cases 
against Tymoshenko too quickly [The Kuchma administration had charged 
Tymoshenko with embezzlement and bribery. She - and Yushchenko at the time 
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- called these charges politically motivated.  The majority of these charges were 
dismissed for lack of probable cause by courts.  The rest were closed by Piskun 
in February.]²  Piskun claimed, ³Yushchenko hinted that it would be very good if 
the investigations were renewed,² for use ³against Tymoshenko in the upcoming 
parliamentary elections.²  Further, he said that Yushchenko had urged him to 
drop the investigation of Poroshenko and had become angry when Piskun said 
that he had questions about the payment for a plane chartered to carry guests 
from the US to his inauguration.  (6)  Perhaps not coincidentally, Piskun is 
thought to be interested in a spot on the electoral list of The Yulia Tymoshenko 
Bloc in the upcoming elections.  
 
The vacancy at the prosecutor-general¹s office leaves a number of deputies in 
charge of high-profile cases.  One of those deputies, Viktor Shokin, was tasked 
by Kuchma in 2002 with overseeing the investigation into Tymoshenko¹s 
activities, and with ³investigating² the Gongadze murder. He was also the lead 
investigator of the Gongadze case under Yushchenko.  
 
Shokin is known to be close to Poroshenko, earning himself the nickname Poro-
Shokin in Ukraine¹s media.  The activities of Shokin in the coming weeks should 
be instructive, particularly if, as expected, Yushchenko finds it difficult to convince 
parliament to confirm his new choice for prosecutor-general. 
 
There is little doubt that Piskun¹s tenure as prosecutor-general was 
disappointing.  As Zerkalo Tyzhnia (Nedeli) put it, ³Nobody was too fond of him.² 
(7)  However, nobody has been too fond of Piskun for quite some time.  His 
critics have been pushing for his dismissal for months.  Perhaps the president 
simply was responding to these calls.  But the fact that Yushchenko chose this 
particular moment, weeks after investigations were opened surrounding the 
activities of his aides, and months before a pivotal parliamentary election where 
he faces his former ally as his opponent, leads to more questions than answers. 
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BELARUS 
The next revolution? 
 In July of 2006, Belarus will hold its presidential election.  President Aleksandr 
Lukashenko will stand for a third term, after voters ostensibly approved a third 
term for the current president in a referendum last year. 
 
On 2 October, the political and civic opposition to Lukashenko voted to unite 
behind long-time civic activist Aleksandr Milinkevich.  The vote came during an 
³opposition congress² in Minsk where 800 activists gathered to state their 
readiness to work to unseat Lukashenko.   The willingness of all opposition 
activists to support Milinkevich ends to recent personality clashes and power 
struggles among opposition leaders.  It is telling that Milinkevich primarily has 
worked at the grassroots level, running legal aid and community 
resource/outreach organizations, instead of in national politics.  Clearly, 
Belarusian activists are emulating the Ukrainian and Georgian political-civic 
coalition model as closely as possible, and civic activists from both countries 
were in attendance at the conference. 
 
Milinkevich has a difficult road ahead, given that most of Lukashenko¹s previous 
opponents have either disappeared or ended up in prison.  "Many people ask me 
whether I know what I'm facing,² he said after the vote.   ³Maybe I risk being 
jailed. Maybe I will be shot at. But every opposition member knows he is 
threatened, along with his family.² (8)  
 
In preparation for the election, Lukashenko launched an attack on the last 
remaining non-state-owned newspaper in Belarus – Narodnaya Volya (People¹s 
Will).  The paper has been informed that state-owned newspaper kiosks will no 
longer carry it and a state-owned printing house will no longer print it.  Editors 
have responded by signing a contract with a printer in Smolensk, Russia, and 
planning to distribute the paper themselves.  The paper currently has 29,000 
subscribers. 
 50 
 
European Parliament again condemns Belarus 
The European Parliament released a statement on 29 September, in which it 
called on member states ³to identify and freeze the personal assets of President 
Lukashenko and those other senior members of the regime who ensure the 
continuation of the dictatorship,² and to expand the list of Belarusian authorities 
subject to the visa ban ³to prevent them from entering the territory of EU member 
states.² 
 
The parliament called for independent investigations into the disappearances of 
former Minister of the Interior Yuriy Zakharenko, former deputy speaker of the 
Belarusian parliament Viktor Honchar, businessman Anatoly Krasovsky, and 
ORT television cameraman Dmitriy Zavadski.  It also demanded the release of 
numerous political prisoners, including former Foreign Relations Minister and 
presidential candidate Mikhail Marynich, whose health reportedly has been 
steadily deteriorating, and now can neither see nor walk. (9) 
 
There was no mention in the resolution, however, of freezing oil exports, which, 
according to a regional NGO, is what would really make a difference. 
 
On 30 September, the Bratislava-based Pontis Foundation released a study 
recommending that the EU ³could strike a direct blow against the Minsk 
government by blocking oil exports from Belarus.²  The study found that 
Belarusian authorities and government-owned businesses make considerable 
profits by importing Russian oil into Belarus at bargain prices and then exporting 
it to the EU at market - or just below market - prices.  These contracts with the 
EU are reportedly worth up to 3.3 billion euros each year.  (10) 
 
A Belarusian diplomat quoted by the EU Observer didn¹t seem concerned, 
however:  ³I believe the EU is very interested in importing our oil and raw 
materials, especially now that the prices are so high,² he said.  ³The EU would 
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not like to lost this quite important source.² (11)  The diplomat is undoubtedly 
correct. 
 
MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE 
The EU moves in 
The European Union this month made a major commitment to Moldova and 
Ukraine, agreeing to a moderate-sized border-monitoring mission covering over 
1,200 kilometers.  The mission will include the Transnistria section of the 
Ukraine-Moldova border, which has been identified by the EU as one of the 
biggest havens for smuggling activities in Europe.  The commitment to the 
mission represents a huge step forward for Moldova, particularly because it 
coincided with the opening of an EU representative office in Chisinau, and with 
the announcement that the organization will double its aid to the country in the 
coming year.  
 
Perhaps even more important, at the time of its signature on the border 
agreement, Ukraine re-committed itself to accepting only imports with a 
Moldovan custom stamp.  As such, unregistered products from Transnistria will 
be refused entry.  Although Ukraine announced this step in early 2005, its 
commitment had appeared to be wavering in recent months.  Ukrainian and 
Moldovan authorities hope that this step, combined with the border mission, will 
begin to undermine the lucrative smuggling trade that provides the necessary 
financial support to keep Transnistrian authorities in firm control.  Whether they 
truly will be able to reduce this trade is debatable, but these measures represent 
significant progress. 
 
The border-monitoring mission will have extraordinary powers to search and 
seize, and to undertake surprise visits to customs locations throughout the 
monitored section of the border.  In addition, EU representatives also will conduct 
training for Moldovan and Ukrainian border guards and help modernize border 
positions.  They will begin their activities on 1 December.   
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